1. Field of Invention
The present invention relates to voting apparatus, systems and methods of voting.
2. Description of the Prior Art
In recent years, electronic voting machines have brought numerous improvements to the voting process. Because of this technology, votes are tabulated more accurately and in a more timely manner than could ever be accomplished with the older paper-based systems. Along with the improvements, however, have come new concerns centered, largely, around the issue of system security and stability. These concerns have resulted in doubts about the electronic devices and, among many voters, doubts about the integrity of our electoral process.
It would seem desirable, then, to find a way to assure voters that their votes are actually being recorded and counted accurately.
Proposed solutions generally take two forms: 1) adding a “voter-verified paper trail” (VVPT) to the electronic voting booth, and 2) tagging each vote in a way that enables a voter to confirm at a later time that the vote was recorded correctly.
Solutions like Gibbs (U.S. 2002/0128901 A1) provide a PIN (Personal Identification Number) which is generated at the voting location, along with a “voter validation receipt number”. Using this PIN and receipt number, the voter can access a national database of votes to determine if his/her vote was recorded correctly.
Chung (U.S. 2004/0046021 A1) proposes the use of a voter ID, unique to each person. When used in conjunction with a “smart card” and printer, a unique “session ID” can then be generated after the vote is cast. This session ID is stored along with the actual vote and can be accessed by the voter after the votes are tallied.
Chaum (U.S. 2003/0158775 A1) proposes a system whereby a ballot is scanned or read and then a portion of that ballot is “released” to the voter, while the rest is destroyed. The portion that is retained by the voter can be linked to the full ballot in order that the voter can prove his/her vote to authorities. Various mechanical methods are proposed for capturing voter “indicia”—that is, elements that are unique to a voter. The output for the voter is a “serial number” which can then be used to access one's vote on the internet.
These solutions attempt to address the issue of an inability to audit electronic voting systems. Yet they introduce new problems, while falling short of solving the auditability problem.
The problems introduced by using a voter-verified paper trail (VVPT) have been described in detail by organizations like the nonpartisan organization “The League of Women Voters of the United States”. On May 5, 2004, Kay J. Maxwell—the president of The League of Women Voters (LWV)—responded to an invitation by The Election Assistance Commission to address the controversies surrounding electronic voting systems. Their conclusion was that although “Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems can be an important part of election reform efforts . . . the League has not been persuaded of the wisdom of VVPT systems.” (http://www.lwv.org/where/promoting/votingrights—EACTestimony0504.ht ml).
In her testimony, Ms. Maxwell points out a number of problems with using paper in the polling booth. In automated systems, “printers are the least reliable of computer system components. They jam, they need paper, they are slow and they are an added cost . . . Voters' privacy is also at risk each time a printer jams and a poll worker has to work to remove a paper jam.”
The second aspect of the aforementioned proposals is the “tagging” of each vote with a unique identifier that is captured and stored along with the actual vote. Whether the “tag” is called an ID, a “session identifier” or a serial number, the intent is the same: to enable a voter to access his/her vote at a later time to confirm that the vote was recorded correctly.
Unfortunately, the approach in generating this unique identifier also creates a need for an external piece of hardware so that the voter can remember the actual identifier itself. This hardware might be a printer, a “smart card” or some other add-on technology which, as with VVPT, results in unacceptable expense.
Finally, the problem with both approaches is that they significantly impact the actual voting process—changing the very way we go about voting. These changes introduce a complexity into the voting process that may well result in a greater burden on the polling place workers. This complexity may also result in a level of intimidation for voters that results in fewer, rather than more, people casting their votes using these devices.
FIG. 1 illustrates a diagram of a typical polling location 10 at which voters 11 cast electronic ballots with electronic voting machines 16 located in a voting booth 17 which may be utilized with the practice of the present invention. Individual voters 11, after traveling to the polling location 10, wait in a cue and then perform a sign in process, such as approaching a table 12 where one or more poll workers/officials 14 perform the step of authorization such that the voters satisfy local requirements to vote. The voter 11 may satisfy these local requirements by signing his/her name in a registration book next to a copy of his/her previously-recorded signature or by some other mechanisms. For example, in other localities, the voter 11 may show a driver's license or other photo ID. The voter is permitted to vote once the voter 11 satisfies the polling workers/officials 14 that he/she is a properly registered voter. At that point in time, the voter 11 enters into a cue at which the voter is ultimately granted admission to a voting booth 17 containing an electronic voting machine 16 which contains a voting machine controller 18 which may be any form of programmed processor, server, computer, etc. and associated memory storage 20. As is understood, since the voter 11 enters into the confines of the voting booth 17, the voter is completely anonymous—no additional requirement being required for the voter to again identify he/she to a voting official/poll worker 14. Anonymity goes to the very heart of the voting process and any attempt to tie a voter to a specific vote (as with a “smart card” or “other specialized voting identification) runs the risk of eroding the feeling anonymity by the voter. Therefore, as the voter 11 enters the voting booth 17, the voter is unencumbered by anything—except the task of voting using the electronic voting machine 16.
With electronic voting machines 16, the process of casting electronic ballots has become quite simple and efficient. It is important that any attempt to make the voting process more auditable, secure or accurate, not negatively impact ease of using the voting booth 17. Otherwise, such attempts will be considered counterproductive by voting officials and the voters themselves. The votes themselves are stored in the storage 20, which as illustrated, most often is directly attached to the voting machine controller 18 and is typically inside of the voting booth 17 in a secure housing. Once the voter has voted, he/she exits the polling location 10 as indicated.
At the end of the voting day, the votes stored in the storage 20 of each electronic voting machine 16 must be read and consolidated as represented by the consolidate function 22 which may be performed under control of a programmed processor. As illustrated in FIG. 1, a local area network may receive the inputs from all of the individual storages 20 associated with all of the electronic voting machine 16. However, because of consideration of costs, complexity and security, each electronic voting machine 16 is typically a stand alone machine with the consolidate function 22 not being performed electronically. A readout function 24 is coupled to the consolidation function 22, whether done locally with each electronic voting machine 16 or via the consolidation function 22 which provides the polling workers/officials 14 the ability to record the tally of cast votes once the polls are closed. Finally, after the readout 24 has been obtained, the results of the votes cast at the polling location 10 are provided in a report as indicated in the report results function 26. The report results function 26 is essentially the completion of the voting process.
FIG. 2 illustrates a simplified flow chart of the above-described process. The initial step involved with voting is that the voter 11 enters the voting booth 17 containing the electronic voting machine 16 as indicated by step 30. The voting process proceeds from the voter 11 entering the voting booth 17 to the voter 11 being presented with a ballot and making choices while within the voting booth as indicated by step 31. Next, the voter 11 makes his/her selections as indicated by block 32. Thereafter, the voter 11 reviews the selections which he/she has initially made in registering the vote including any changes so as to generate a voter ballot. After the review process, the voter actively indicates to the electronic voting machine 16 that the voting process is done by pushing a button or pulling a lever, etc. as indicated by step 34. A display associated with the electronic voting machine 16, within the voting booth 17 typically will display a message to the voter 11 thanking the voter for voting, as indicated by step 36. Thereafter, the voter 11 exits the voting booth 17 as indicated by step 38.